Data &
Technology
Research
Reports
Report Solutions
Reports Library
Actionable
Strategies
Free
Resources
Simple Backtest Calculator
Simple Seasonality Calculator
The Kelly Criterion Calculator
Sentiment Geo Map
Public Research Reports
Free Webinar
Pricing
Company
About
Meet Our Team
In the News
Testimonials
Client Success Stories
Contact
Log inLoginSign up
< BACK TO ALL REPORTS

Looking to financials for a bottoming clue

Jason Goepfert
2020-04-06
The financial sector hasn't done much to confirm the idea that stocks are near a bottom. On a relative basis, they continue to reach lower lows. But a look at past bottoms shows that this is not unusual behavior, as the group rarely leads out of major declines.

One of the many concerns being bandied about now is the continued relative underperformance of financials. Analysts keep looking for this group to lead, or at least show some signs of relative strength versus the broader market, and they keep disappointing. Even with a big day so far on Monday, the ratio is barely moving.

It raises a good question - at other recent and important low points, did financials turn up relative to the market before stocks bottomed? We'll look at the most recent inflection points, as well as the more important lows since 1928 to see if there's a pattern.

For those who prefer to read the conclusion first, the answer was "no."

At the bottom(s) in 2015-16, there were negative divergences the whole way. The ratio of the financial sector to the S&P 500 kept hitting lower lows, either along with the S&P or even as the S&P made higher lows. If we were watching the financial sector for clues, we would have dismissed the probability of any kind of a low anywhere around these time frames.

It was no different in 2011. Financials performed horribly around that time, and even as the S&P was stabilizing, financials kept sinking on a relative basis.

At the major low in 2009, same story. During the depths of the panic in October and November 2008, it's no surprise to see that financials were leading the market lower. That was still the case into the early spring of 2009 as stocks formed a v-shaped bottom and financials were hitting new relative lows that entire time.

At the other major low that decade, in 2002, it was mostly the same picture but a case could be made there was a larger positive divergence. In October of that year, financials made a clear lower low and would have suggested a failure was imminent. As the S&P rallied then fell again to test the low in early 2003, financials were sinking quickly but at least formed a higher low than the previous October. So that was something of a good sign.

At the medium-term bottoms in 2001, relative strength in financials proved to be a decent sign in March, but didn't provide much of a clue following the tragedy of 9/11. Even as the S&P rebounded strongly, financials kept sinking on a relative basis.

The banking crisis of 1990 saw financial tank drastically even as the broader market held up relatively well. By only following the financials, an investor would have been deeply pessimistic about the probability of a bottom and would have missed out on a massive recovery, or at least would have been negative at the lows.

During the crash of 1987, there was a chaotic spike in relative strength that quickly evaporated. By the time stocks bottomed in December, financials were hitting a years-long relative low, and an investor watching this sector for clues would have once again been misguided.

The big bottom in 1974 is the one case where analysts using this method could cherry-pick as a reason to watch for relative strength from this sector. As stocks slid horribly into that fall, financials were perking up and they formed a classic positive divergence. It would have been an excellent clue that investors should be using lower prices to load up on shares.

The banking crisis in 1932 showed a somewhat similar pattern to a couple other bottoms. During the initial panic and slide lower at the ultimate low, there was no positive clue from financials. But after the initial bounce off the low and subsequent test later that year, financials were showing decent relative strength.

During the initial crash in 1929 and subsequent after-shocks, there was no positive clue from financials. They continued to hit new lows relative to the broader market the whole way, including at the major low.

Overall, there is nothing here to suggest that an investor needs to look for financials as a source of relative strength ahead of a low, major or minor, in the broader market.

Sorry, you don't have access to this report

Upgrade your subscription plan to get access
Go to Dasboard
DATA &
TECHnologies
IndicatorEdge
‍
BackTestEdge
‍
Other Tools
‍
DataEdge API
RESEARCH
reports
Research Solution
‍
Reports Library
‍
actionable
Strategies
Trading Strategies
‍
Smart Stock Scanner
‍
FREE
RESOUrCES
Simple Backtest
Calculator
Simple Seasonality
Calculator
The Kelly Criterion
Calculator
Sentiment Geo Map
‍
Public Research Reports
‍
Free Webinar
COMPANY
‍
About
‍
Meet our Team
‍
In the News
‍
Testimonials
‍
Client Success Stories
Pricing
Bundle pricing
‍
Announcements
‍
FAQ
© 2024 Sundial Capital Research Inc. All rights reserved.
Setsail Marketing
TermsPrivacyAffiliate Program
Risk Disclosure: Futures and forex trading contains substantial risk and is not for every investor. An investor could potentially lose all or more than the initial investment. Risk capital is money that can be lost without jeopardizing ones’ financial security or life style. Only risk capital should be used for trading and only those with sufficient risk capital should consider trading. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results.

Hypothetical Performance Disclosure: Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations, some of which are described below. No representation is being made that any account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown; in fact, there are frequently sharp differences between hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently achieved by any particular trading program. One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk of actual trading. for example, the ability to withstand losses or to adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the preparation of hypothetical performance results and all which can adversely affect trading results.

Testimonial Disclosure: Testimonials appearing on this website may not be representative of other clients or customers and is not a guarantee of future performance or success.